

A•QUESTION•OF•VALUE

A SOCIAL CAPITAL

AND

COMMUNITY-BASED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

LITERATURE REVIEW

by

Donovan Woollard

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Donovan Woollard is a Graduate Research Assistant on the Georgia Basin Futures Project at the Sustainable Development Research Institute at the University of British Columbia.

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1 INTRODUCTION

There is growing recognition that there are severe – some would say fundamental – problems with the ways in which resources are managed in British Columbia. In addition to critiques of existing approaches to managing the province’s forests and fisheries, a growing body of work presents a range of alternatives that address the need for greater participation and democracy in resource allocation and management. A diverse group of authors is stepping forward to record their visions of alternative ways of doing things.

This working paper is the culmination of a literature review on materials pertaining to social capital and community-based resource management.¹ This is a task not without challenges. Although there is extensive literature on both topics and fundamental relationships between the two, there is little that explicitly links them. Most of the literature on social capital presents more abstract analyses of the concepts involved with the term; discussions of its applications tend to be somewhat more general than an analysis of the term’s relation to community-based resource management. While many articles on community-based resource management state that a core strength of this approach is that it tends to boost the social cohesion of a community, the emphasis of most of this literature is upon the economic and, especially, the environmental benefits of

¹ Definitions of these terms will be provided later in this text.

the approach. This is unfortunate, as one of the core strengths of the community-based approach to resource management is that it is very effective in addressing each of the *three* imperatives of sustainability. As defined by Robinson and Tinker (1997), these are: the *ecological*, ie. the need to remain within planetary biophysical carrying capacity; the *economic*, ie. the need to ensure and maintain adequate material standards of living; and the *social*, ie. the need to provide social structures that propagate and sustain the values by which communities wish to live. With few exceptions, however, it would seem that most of the literature written on community-based resource management pays less attention to its effectiveness at building and augmenting positive social capital. This report, then, will speculate upon the impact of community-based resource management on this social imperative.

On the basis of the materials analysed in this project, it is the position of this researcher that community-based resource management has the potential to be a very effective means by which to achieve each of the three imperatives of sustainability. Robinson & Tinker (1997) hypothesise that these objectives, which are often seen as contradictory in today's scale-oriented and specialised approach to resource economy, can be reconciled through *dematerialisation* (reducing the amount of material and energy that is needed to support our lifestyles) and *resocialisation* (changing our lifestyles and social support systems to uncouple human well-being from economic growth). Community-based resource management is effective not just in "doing more with less", but in stimulating the community processes that promote and augment positive social capital. After initially outlining the inability of the status quo to reconcile these imperatives of sustainability, this report will present a discussion of social capital, followed by a discussion of its applications in community level resource activities.²

² It should be noted that, while this project technically pertains to community-based resource management broadly defined, the vast majority of the materials pertain to the forest industry and community forestry.

2 THE STATUS QUO

As attested by many of the books and articles analysed in this project, British Columbia's resource-based economies are in what could charitably be called 'transition' (although in many respects the term 'decline' is appropriate as well). Many of the province's natural fisheries are on the point of collapse and its forests are being cut above regeneration rates; jobs per unit of goods have plummeted; and the share of the GDP contributed by these industries has decreased significantly. Because of the principles underlying much of this activity, and the political economy in which its companies operate, this is seen by many authors as an inevitability. According to M'Gonigle (1998), for example, this is an inherent quality of corporate-led extraction; no amount of fine-tuning will overcome it. Large-scale corporate resource extraction is unsustainable environmentally, economically, and socially.

Few of these authors are more eloquent in their identification and dissection of traditional Western economic principles than Herman Daly. Daly (1996) takes aim at the premise that natural resources are valueless 'stuff' until human capital and/or labour is added to them; with no inherent value (or at least some form of value that does not derive from its functionality), natural resources can and should be used with abandon. According to this view, because production and consumption do not equal creation and destruction – but rather a rearrangement of pre-existing materials – there is a limitless supply of stuff that can be structured and shaped to unlimited economic benefit. Therefore, "you can only disarrange matter (consume) if you have previously arranged it (produced), and resources are the totally passive recipients of form (value) added by labour and capital" (Daly, 1996). It is thus inherently impossible to subtract value that was not already added through human manipulation in some form; the term 'over-consumption' is an oxymoron.

Daly's response is that, while economic value clearly is added to material through human inputs, this addition does not occur to inert, interchangeable blocks. It is rather added to that matter and energy that is most capable of receiving and embodying this economic activity. For example, carbon in the atmosphere is much more difficult to shape and form than carbon structured in a tree. For this reason, the proper economic

objective is to transform the natural into the artificial to the optimal extent, ie. the point at which the total service (the sum of natural and created capitals) is maximised. Unless this internal natural value is factored into the equation the result is effectively a “natural subsidy.” Human welfare is not a function of consumption per se but one of capital. Effective economic systems are those that maintain natural and physical capital rather than ones which maximise productive throughput at their expense (Daly, 1996). As will become explicit in later sections of this report, one of the core lessons that many economists need to learn is that there are many forms of capital besides financial capital: natural and social are two crucial ones in any consideration of sustainability.

Hammond (1993) introduces a similar argument. He takes aim at the fact that, because existing legislation and dominant resource extraction methods reflect only the value of human capital and labour, this value tends to be presented as objective and value-free. Debates over land-use tend to be characterised by the ‘objective’ economists and technicians versus the ‘idealistic’ conservationists and alternate use activists. In the absence of some degree of non-functional (or even non-economic) value, existing resource planning tends to reflect economic and political timeframes, boundaries, and processes instead of those of ecosystems. In the meantime, this is having dire impacts upon the ecosystem and the society that depends upon its health. According to Hammond, then, we need to accept that discussions over resource use (in this case forests) are deeply value-laden; rather than just getting more facts, we need to choose an ethic. We need to choose who is going to extract how much, by what methods, and for what end.

According to Hammond (1993), Marchak et al (1999), M’Gonigle (1998) and others, the ethic that we must choose is one that respects the processes of ecosystems. The result of the existing resource use ethic has been a steady liquidation of old-growth timber in the absence of intensive silviculture. As Marchak et al (1999) indicate, there is a known discrepancy between the rate of cut and the rate of regeneration. This discrepancy, which is essentially an over-cut, is known in forestry circles as the “falldown effect”. In the fisheries, many natural salmon runs have reached the point of collapse, yet most investment is in more efficient boats and fish-farms. The scale-based

corporate model is simply not ecologically sound. For years, however, this system has been maintained due to the fact that whole regions of BC (and other resource-based areas) are economically dependent upon it: regions are dependent upon the jobs that the activity generates and governments rely upon the sales of resources and licences for revenue.

These practices do not make long-term economic sense either. Resource collapse, scarcity, or inaccessibility entail dire implications for resource economies and communities. To date, resource towns have been seen as ‘resource-dependent’ rather than ‘resource-based’, and have existed to serve the resource economy rather than have it serve them. The result is analogous to a captured state: governments are forced to grant reductions in taxes, subsidise operations, and create new incentives to keep the activities going (Marchak, 1995). As illustrated in Markey & Roseland (1999), most forest communities in this province are typified by specialisation and dependency rather than diversity and self-reliance: most are exclusively involved with extraction while over 50% of the total forestry contribution to BC’s economy is generated through industrial activities based in Greater Vancouver. Employment in resource industries has been falling for years and extraction-based communities are the hardest hit. For example, despite increases in production since 1980, jobs in each of the traditional forest sectors (logging, saw and planer mills, and pulp and paper) have plummeted (Marchak et al, 1999).³ Many of the communities that depend upon these jobs have struggled to find other means of employment. Some, such as Gold River, have nearly collapsed; others, such as Chemainus and now Ucluelet, have had to change their character dramatically to tap into tourism.

At the same time, employment is steadily growing in smaller sectors such as shakes and shingles, forestry services (planting, silviculture, etc.), and value-added manufacturing. The latter in particular produces many more jobs per unit of wood than

the commodity-producing sectors (jobs that are not as well-paying as mill-jobs but still within the provincial average). The core problem that these sectors face is that existing tenure arrangements and the lack of open log markets make it very difficult for them to access competitively priced materials (Marchak et al, 1999).⁴

It is necessary to shift to a new vision of resource-based economies that will neither succumb to resource exhaustion nor leave resource communities without control or stability. The approach taken in this paper is that the organisational structures that govern resource use matter a great deal. One vision, which will be discussed at some length in this paper, sees communities taking greater responsibility for the resources from which they draw their quality of life. This will not be easy. There are many external and internal challenges to a community's taking control over its resources and stewarding them for sustainability.⁵ Tenure arrangements, legislation, and economic precedents favour large-scale actors who extract for export. According to Marchak (1995), one of the core difficulties that the majority of BC resource towns face in this situation is internal and fundamental. Most non-native communities in British Columbia are less than 75 years old and were established to house workers in large-scale industrial resource extraction and/or processing. They do not reflect any connection with the locale other than its proximity to the resource. Rather than being located near fertile agricultural grounds or fresh water routes, for example, these communities are located wherever the company sets up its operations.⁶ Because of the rate of resource extraction in many areas, it is inevitable that these companies move on. When this occurs, the community is

³ In coastal communities, many fishing fleets have been reduced to a fraction of their previous size. One such example is Gibsons, BC: the fleet in this community was halved between 1991 and 1996 (Statistics Canada).

⁴ M'Gonigle (1998), Marchak (1995), Marchak et al (1999), and Scarfe (1998) all indicate that corporate dominance over tenures and the absence of open log markets create a situation in which it is very difficult for smaller actors to access resources at an affordable price.

⁵ As will be discussed below, these concepts of community control and sustainability are not inherently linked.

⁶ First Nations communities, which for centuries existed in the context of the ecology and geography of their regions, often face the same difficulties. Although many nations managed the forests and fisheries for centuries, loss of access to these resources and outright relocation entail that much resource knowledge – technical and generic – has been lost or suppressed (Nathan, 1993).

without context and lacks the diverse population, skill-sets, and social cohesion necessary to overcome this blow.

Marchak's is not as damning an argument as it may seem at the outset. The rest of this report presents a number of concepts and approaches to shifting the emphasis of resource-based economies to being consistent with ecological principles rather than counter to them, to serving rural communities rather than demanding their servitude. It is the position of this researcher that the processes and values that lead to healthy ecosystems are precisely those which lead to healthy communities. For this reason, the cultivation of positive social capital is an integral component of re-establishing the necessary linkages between human settlements, their environmental settings, and their economies.

3 SOCIAL CAPITAL

3.1 Defining Social Capital

In most of the literature, the term 'social capital' generally refers to the shared knowledge, understandings, and patterns of interaction that a group brings to productive activity. This is specifically applicable to organisations, structures, and social relations that are independent of large corporations or the state, a domain often called "civil society". It is created when individuals learn about each others' strengths so that they can develop trust, and work together for a generalised form of betterment and reciprocity (Roseland, 1999). Social capital has implications beyond the level of social cohesion of a community. Putnam argues that this "community-building" also has implications for boosting productive potential and returns on investment (cited in Roseland, 1999). One of the common barriers to community economic development (CED) is that people often do not know the vast array of skills that their neighbours possess. As such, they employ

the services of others rather than those of their neighbours. This results in unnecessary economic leakage and does not permit economic (and social) multipliers to take effect.

‘Social capital’, as a concept, has moved beyond the realm of academe and is often used in common discourse. When this occurs, however, there is concern that its meaning will evolve.⁷ There is, for example, concern that such widespread usage of the term leads to some very contradictory policies and projects being undertaken in its name. Social capital can be used to justify communitarianism, liberal individualism, or even conservative and libertarian arguments against any government intervention in market or society. That being said, however, one could argue that there is room within the concept for both, and any debate on which is real social capital would not be fruitful. The overt value that social capital rests upon is the attitude that participatory democracy is an effective means of addressing the range of issues that arise in human affairs and their ecological context. As such, it is a structural value rather than a value of content. The content will vary with the community and the context.

A position that may have something in common with this approach is that of Portes (1998). For Portes, the core problem with many current analyses of the term is that they give social capital inherent value, and positive value at that. He argues that the term ‘social capital’ invokes a descriptive concept that has both positive and negative impacts upon society. Many of the same mechanisms of sociability that lead to positive results can also promote the inverse. For example, the mobility that ethnic economic niches promote for members of that ethnicity (connections, jobs, advice, etc.) can also serve to exclude “outsiders” from participation. Strong social capital can also indicate a suppression of individual freedoms. Community bonds serve to put excessive claims on economically successful individuals within the community to support the whole, or serve to create downward levelling of norms that isolate successful individuals as “sell-outs” or “wannabes”. This raises a core challenge about social networks as a source of mobility. While these networks may be strong and effective in marginalised communities, they

⁷ Longo (1999) presents a sample of the sites that arose through a websearch for the term ‘social capital’. The search produced sites that define social capital as everything from “... that portion of our wealth that we cannot keep ...” and “... companies with undefined ownership ...” to “... social capital is used by everybody and forms a natural monopoly

often include only members of that community rather than members of the mainstream because group members that do attain some level of economic success tend to leave (or be pushed) out of the community. For these reasons, Portes argues that social capital refers to social facts that should be understood and analysed accordingly; they should not be taken as overt social benefits.

Another key debate in the social capital literature is whether it accrues to individuals or communities. Putnam (1995) favours the latter. His discussions tend to emphasise the organisations in a society as the drivers of social capital. Large-scale public participation in these organisations is thus an indicator of “civicness”. There has been a decline in such participation over the past several decades, a fact that he views with great alarm. Portes (1998), however, directs some very pointed criticisms at this position. He makes reference to two common criticisms of Putnam’s position. The first concerns whether or not volunteerism is actually declining, or whether it is shifting to other forms of relationship that Putnam does not recognise. The second asserts that there is a class bias implicit in blaming the masses for this decline rather than the economic and political changes wrought by corporate and government elites.

Portes argues that there is a more fundamental argument to be made as well: Putnam’s position rests upon a logical circularity. As a property of communities rather than individuals in Putnam’s conception, social capital is both cause and effect: it leads to positive outcomes such as economic development and low crime rates, yet the only evidence of its existence comes from precisely these outcomes. Putnam starts with the effect and works back to speculate what distinguishes the successful from the non, and tries to explain all observed differences through this lens. This practice is legitimate in principle, but only if alternative interpretations are also considered. Putnam, according to Portes, merely devises a variable (civic virtue) that is tautological: successful communities obviously have it; unsuccessful ones obviously do not. In order to be

(e.g., highways, airports, public utilities)”. As Longo points out, these conceptions seem to misunderstand the ‘capital’

meaningful, Portes counters, the presence of social capital – whether individual or collective – must be demonstrable prior to the expected outcomes that it may promote.⁸

3.2 Social Capital and Natural Capital

After a comprehensive literature review on the topic, the definition ultimately employed by Longo is that social capital refers to the intangible social features of community life that have the *potential* to enhance community well-being, through the cultivation of relationships based upon trust, co-operation, expected norms of behaviour, and networks of civic interaction (Longo, 1999; italics added). This effectively side-steps some of the key debates about social capital, such as whether it accrues to individuals or communities. This report will adhere to this definition.

Another point of debate in the literature is the relationship between social and *natural capital*. The concept of ‘natural capital’ refers to the assets provided by healthy natural systems. It is a means of illustrating that these natural assets can be viewed as analogous to economic assets: if resource extraction and consumption occurs within the levels of regeneration – ie. the ‘interest’ – then this consumption will be more sustainable than if it cuts into the stock – ie. the ‘principal’ – that must be preserved to allow future generations the same standards of living enjoyed by this one. The literature on natural and social capital presents a range of positions on the relationship between the two: that the one causes the other, that the two are correlated, or that they are not necessarily related at all. One point that is universal amongst all of the authors analysed in this review is that social capital cultivation does not require the drawing-down of natural capital. There is no necessary positive link between social capital and material throughput, or even economic wealth. Roseland (1999) points to the Indian state of Kerala, where many of the standard quality of life indicators put the province on a similar footing to the United States, yet with much less material wealth. Positive social capital develops in a context of community networks, trust, and imagination. Nozick et al

aspect of the term, taking it to refer to traditional economic capital rather than something more abstract.

⁸ This is not to assert that there is no ‘virtuous’ circle between social capital and its supposed effects, but merely that its initial presence cannot be indicated simply by those effects. In order to have any analytical meaning, it must be separated from the outcome to some degree.

(1999) and Hammond (1993) put forth the stronger claim that natural and social capital are positively linked. The same processes that lead to healthy ecosystems – biodiversity, connectivity, and stability – have analogues within healthy communities. As Nozick et al assert, “sustainable communities, like ecological communities, are places where members are nourished, supported and encouraged by the web of social relations and by the relationship between human and natural communities” (Nozick et al, 1999).

One potential counter-argument is that, while this may be the case in rural communities which do not have a lot of human assets, it is not the case in urban areas. The “new economy” – service and high-tech – is much less resource-based than the traditional industrial economy. Urban amenities do not rely upon natural capital but rather social and economic capital. But a response to this claim comes from M’Gonigle (1998). M’Gonigle uses a strong conception of sustainability that does not equate natural and artificial assets. There is no complete substitute for natural capital; reliance upon the ‘technological invisible hand’ to come up with something new once the resources run out is sheer folly because we cannot truly understand all of the direct and indirect services with which the environment provides us, let alone model and predict them. All of our economic and social systems, even the service economy-driven cities – are fundamentally embedded in the ecological realm. While the relationships may be less direct in the city than in the rural hinterland, all that we use and need ultimately comes from the natural capital around us.

In the long-term, the depletion of natural capital actually depletes the necessary preconditions for social capital: as the resource base (broadly defined) of the community decreases, so too does the ability of the community to engage in a full range of social, cultural, and economic activities. Natural capital, in return, depends upon social capital for its preservation⁹: the checks and balances, knowledge and skills of local populations with a common interest in the resource base are among the most effective means to

⁹ At least in the absence of a society governed by autocratic deep-ecologists.

promote stewardship of natural capital (M’Gonigle, 1998; Pardo, 1995; and Hammond, 1993).¹⁰ None of these authors would want to state that the one will *necessarily* lead to the other, however. M’Gonigle, especially, is quite clear that his favour for a linkage between the two concepts is that strong social capital would *tend* to be a necessary precondition for the preservation of natural capital. It would be most fair to characterise these approaches as asserting that natural and social capital are each *necessary* but *not sufficient* requirements for the other.

4 COMMUNITY-BASED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

An approach that has great potential to boost the ability of the community to engage in a full range of social, cultural, and economic activities is community-based resource management (CBRM). Many of the articles and books that put forth critiques of corporate-led industrial resource extraction invoke the community-based approach as a solution. CBRM is not prone to critiques of the status quo which state that the latter does not reflect local environmental and social conditions due to its scale, specialisation, and export-orientation. The community-based approach is also more conducive to cultivating resource use strategies that reflect multiple values and community interests. But it must be made explicit that this ‘model’ is actually a grouping of models, some of which are more reflective and holistic than others. For this reason, this discussion of community-based resource management will start with some definitional issues before moving on to applications. It is also crucial to note – following Markey & Roseland (1999) and Nozick et al (1999) – that a crucial aspect of boosting community stability and well-being is to diversify the economy, reducing its dependence upon the resource base. For this reason, it is crucial to note that CBRM must exist within a broader community transition to community economic development (CED). It must be accompanied by local development of value-added manufacturing or processing, and also complement (or at least not hinder) cultivation of non-resource-based activities.

¹⁰ It is crucial to note that none of these authors discusses these issues using the jargon of ‘social’ or ‘natural’ capital.

4.1 Defining Community-Based Resource Management

An effective definition of community-based resource management comes from Duinker et al (1994) in their discussion of community forestry. A 'community forest' is presented as "a tree-dominated ecosystem managed for multiple community values and benefits by the community." As Gunter & Jodway (1999) illustrate, CBRM is based upon the democratic maxim that those affected by a decision should be able to participate in the decision-making process. Duinker et al (1994) strengthen this position to assert that, in order to be a true community-based initiative, a large portion of the community must approve of the initiative and participate in some way; local ownership alone does not qualify if it is not accountable to the community.

But this raises an immediate question: how is one to define the affected community? Should one use geographic parameters or economic ones? That is to say, should the decision-making process include all those that live within the watershed? Or should it include all those that depend upon the resources in the watershed, no matter where they live? This was played out in the debate over who should participate in the resource management committee for Clayoquot Sound: letting the residents of Ucluelet and Port Alberni into the process amounted to victory for those who would define community economically. But as Duinker et al point out, this can lead to a *reductio ad absurdum*: where does one draw the line on resource dependence? One could just as easily say that people in Vancouver (or even Auckland, New Zealand) should have a place at the community roundtable (Duinker et al, 1994).

It would seem that the only (or at least the best) way to overcome this difficulty is to define the "community" in CBRM geographically, ie. those that live within some defined boundary. One of the core problems with the present system is that communities often rely upon a healthy resource much more than the people that see the bulk of the economic returns from the extraction of these resources. CBRM is a means to overcome this difficulty. It gives decision-making power to the people that cannot move their operations overseas, who engage with their environment in a range of manners, and who will be most affected by an economic downturn. It should be noted that there are issues to be dealt with in this approach as well, especially in communities that have been

successful in diversifying and attracting a range of new residents. In Squamish – to use Gill & Reed’s (1998) example – many are attracted to the community not for its resources but rather for its amenities: its proximity to Vancouver and Whistler, its scenic location, and its small-town feel. This often puts the newcomers in conflict with some of the long-term residents who favour maintaining the community’s resource-based economy. But with proper facilitation, this has the potential to be a healthy and fruitful debate, one which will promote land-use decisions that reflect a number of local values and cultivate positive social capital.

Another key debate in the literature is the degree to which CBRM is explicitly based upon principles of sustainability. As indicated above, Gunter & Jodway (1999) assert that it is based upon principles of participatory democracy. Without explicit reference to the ecological, however, it is very conceivable that a community will democratically decide to pursue an extraction programme that is as unsustainable as the status quo. Some critics, such as M’Gonigle (1998), point out that the existing ‘success-stories’ of community forestry in BC – the Mission and North Cowichan Municipal Forests – are very successful in addressing the values that formed their mandate: they have boosted and stabilised local employment, and provide millions of dollars annually to the municipal coffers. But both use rates of cut that are much higher than the natural rate of regeneration. In his opinion, these plots cannot be seen as community-based initiatives at all: if they drain the natural capital of the region, any physical or social capital benefits are unsustainable; if they are unsustainable they are not in the long-term interests of the community (M’Gonigle, 1998).

For this reason, CBRM must have a more rigid definition than that given by Gunter & Jodway. In addition to participatory democracy, CBRM must be grounded upon all three imperatives of sustainability: it must take a holistic view which encompasses not just the health and stability of the human community but also that of the ecological community. In effect, CBRM must explicitly be defined as a means to sustain natural capital if it is to be seen as “managed for multiple community values and benefits”.

4.2 Social Capital And Community-Based Resource Management

While the linkages between natural and social capital have been discussed, as have those between CBRM and natural capital, the links between social capital and CBRM need further examination. To revisit, the definition of social capital employed in this report states that social capital refers to the intangible social features of community life that have the *potential* to enhance community well-being, through the cultivation of relationships based upon trust, co-operation, expected norms of behaviour, and networks of civic interaction (Longo, 1999). Many see community-based resource management as an activity that would tend to augment community well-being, relationships, and networks. In fact, CBRM can be a means to overcome the stultifying effects of social capital to which Portes makes reference. Because CBRM is based upon active public participation, it provides an avenue for a greater number and range of values and opinions to be voiced. Rather than the cartels of government, corporation, and union, debate will break through the exclusionary status quo (which is a form of social capital as well) to more accurately reflect the interests of the whole community. Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995) – who are among the only authors to directly discuss CBRM in the context of social capital – indicate that CBRM is a means by which to draw local knowledge, skills, experiences, attitudes, and values into the decision-making process. This local understanding can and should direct the scientific analyses of local systems that are the basis of impact assessments. In effect, community-based processes such as this can directly increase positive social capital even as they use this social capital to improve resource management.

One obvious link between social capital and CBRM is that both have their foundation in the principles of participatory democracy and sustainability. Beyond this, neither has an inherent bias toward any particular value set. They do, however, tend to heighten opportunities for a greater range of values to be expressed. Perhaps the greatest aspect of social capital and community-based resource management is that consideration of both encourage land-use and resource management discussions to enter the realm of value, economic and otherwise. These are not inappropriate discussions to have in this context: as indicated above, some very questionable values drive current resource

allocation and management; this merely gives an opportunity to talk about it. The values that one brings to CBRM will shape the conceptual framework that one employs.

M’Gonigle (1998) and Hammond (1993) would tend to favour CBRM because they see it as instrumental in achieving a larger need for bringing human resource consumption in line with ecological processes. Others, such as Pardo (1995), favour it because of its tendency toward environmental justice, ie. it leads to increased environmental stewardship through cultivating the capacity of local marginalised peoples (in the ‘majority’ or ‘minority’ world¹¹) to steward their resources for maximum local benefit. Still others, such as Allan & Frank (1994) value the effect that CBRM has had in allowing their local communities – Mission and North Cowichan respectively – to boost their economic stability and self-reliance.

Another crucial aspect of this approach is that, in addition to leading to better management plans, it can promote greater adherence to them. Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995) argue that one problem with current systems is that they create an “us versus them” dynamic: regulations are set by government and may or may not relate to the local setting; non-compliance is thus seen as an affront to government regulators rather than to the community which relies most upon the health of the resource. If the regulations and norms are developed at the local level, the community effectively becomes the regulator. There are thus a number of social checks and balances that will tend to promote a higher degree of adherence and local ‘buy-in’.

In the opinion of this researcher, CBRM – like social capital – is desirable insofar as its cultivation would *tend* toward the achievement of all of the above. Community-based resource management, as defined here, is essentially an approach that attempts to cultivate both positive social capital and natural capital under one business plan. CBRM must be seen as a means to promote sustainable development, one that asserts that the

¹¹ The term “majority world” is a more value-neutral way to refer to those peoples who do not live in the “North”. It classifies them not as constituting some unit (ie. the Third World) or as on some unified path (ie. the developing world)

transition to sustainability must reflect and be driven by the interests and the skills of local communities; the best way to achieve this is through adherence to principles of participatory democracy.

5 OUTLOOK FOR COMMUNITY BASED ALTERNATIVES IN BC

As indicated by Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995), CBRM is not a new concept in this region. Many First Nations have lengthy traditions of using locally appropriate, community-based resource management models. The *Kwakiutl* potlatch, for example, served to reinforce responsible management and distribution of resources throughout the community. The goods distributed in the potlatch were usually the processed resources from the land and water under the control of the residential house group. Chiefs could lose status in *Kwakiutl* society if they could not demonstrate through gifting that the resources were being stewarded to provide benefit to all. Today, there is great potential to reinstate these ancient traditions and augment them with similar management systems based in non-Native communities.

Aside from definitional issues, there are a range of other debates and dilemmas implicit in any consideration of how to make CBRM a more conceivable option. Some pertain to which of the many organisational structures the initiative should take, some to the community's capacity to undertake this challenge in the first place; others pertain to issues involving the coherence of the models in the BC legislative and policy context. In effect, CBRM faces a number of challenges that stem from concerns about the level of positive internal social capital and from the external political economy of the province. This section will illustrate some of these challenges, and discuss some of the alternatives presented in the literature.

but rather as what they are, ie. most of the world's population. Furthermore, it draws attention to the fact that the vast majority of the world's population does not live according to the standards that we in the West take for granted.

5.1 Organisational Structure

As indicated by the Ministry of Forests' *Community Forestry Pilot Programme*, there are many ways by which community-based initiatives can be administered. The pilot projects include forests that are run by a local corporation, a municipality, a non-profit society, and co-management with First Nations (BC Ministry of Forests, 1999). This reflects the fact that each of the communities in which these pilots were approved is a unique place with a unique political culture. Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995) illustrate the range of administrative and management options which fall under the rubric of community-based initiatives. In addition to those listed above, these include: traditional village territorial fisheries, regional multi-party management, inshore fishermen's cooperatives, and multi-party habitat protection and watershed restoration initiatives. As noted by Duinker et al (1994), it is crucial to make explicit that – whatever administration model is chosen – public participation must be inclusive. There is a need for representation amongst all of the major stakeholders in the community. The affected community must decide upon who defines the membership, how it is selected (ie. through election, appointment, or some combination of the two) and where the boundaries should be set.

Common features of sustainably managed initiatives include mechanisms for accountability, effective management, equitable representation, and adaptiveness (Pinkerton & Weinstein, 1995). Determining levels of accountability is particularly important. Pinkerton & Weinstein indicate that the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is currently responsible for the condition of fish stocks in Canada. If management devolves to the local level, what sort of effect does this have on DFO's responsibility? This is an interesting question because it draws out the different forms of accountability that CBRM invokes. Some of the factors that promote increased accountability in CBRM are not legalistic (or even legal in some cases) but rather social or locally political. While DFO must maintain some legal accountability for fisheries management, the other forms may instate social checks and balances at the community level.

There is a similar range of options available for financing such an initiative. Duinker et al (1994) state that the degree to which local agencies do a better job of attracting and guiding local forest-based economies is still an open question. They allow the community to have greater control over the resource, but less access to the funds that are required to restore damaged ecosystems (for example); it may even be the case that the latter is more easily attained through a scale-based operation. What is clear, however, is that community-based initiatives will require significant government investment and subsidy in their early years.

5.2 Internal Capacity of Resource-Based Communities

Community-based resource management is a subset of CED. This entails that it must be action-oriented at all stages. Markey & Roseland (1999) remark that CED must always be “mission-oriented”, ie. focus on solving the problems that affect the community. Nozick et al (1999) further this with the statement that CED must also be “process-driven”: the means and ends must be consistent with this philosophy. In short, CED is goal-oriented but rests upon a belief that participatory democracy is the best means by which to arrive at a solution that is just socially, environmentally, and economically. As with any other strategy that falls under the broad heading of CED, CBRM requires a major internal transition away from the skill-sets, knowledge requirements, and community structures promoted by single-industry towns.

Marchak (1995) comes close to asserting that BC industry towns therefore lack the capacity to undertake CBRM. Their short history, artificial creation around corporate resource activity, and the fact that they have never favoured horizontal development and power-sharing approaches entails that they lack the social cohesion found in rural communities in other places. This makes them hard pressed to undertake some project as ambitious as CBRM.

This argument clearly gives one pause. One response to this position is that social capital has key differences from other forms of capital. Like all other forms of capital, social capital is created by spending time and effort in transformational and transactional activities. But social capital is unique in that it is augmented rather than depleted through

regular usage. As such, one could make the counter-argument that community-based resource management will be just the thing to stimulate latent social capital in the community to rally around a common agenda. But on the other hand, there is a question as to the degree to which there is enough of this latent social capital, the social equivalent of start-up capital, to move from the idealistic visioning phase to the actual planning, development, and implementation of a community-based initiative.

A major initial aspect of determining the potential success of a CBRM initiative, then, is identifying the community's internal capacity to this end. Markey & Roseland (1999) define this capacity as the ability to identify, enhance, and mobilise human potential, economic opportunity, social relations, and ecological resources found within a community for the purpose of increasing community stability.¹² It could, therefore, be seen as a higher-order social capital: the ability to mobilise the existing social capital for tangible benefits to the community. The authors outline their *Capacity Assessment Process* and its application in the four pilot communities of the CEDC's research initiative.¹³ This process involves identifying the common characteristics that have proven to be effective in promoting CED in other communities. These "success factors" then allowed the team to develop indicators and measures to be applied in the pilot communities.¹⁴ The authors assert that this benefited the overall CED process in these communities by: integrating local information to create a more holistic and contextual view; stimulating useful comparisons between qualitative and quantitative data; synthesising this information to allow local working groups and leaders to quickly identify their strengths and weaknesses, then identify appropriate development initiatives;

¹² The authors note that, while their conception of community capacity explicitly mentions ecological sustainability, many others do not; others emphasise structural or management aspects of capacity instead.

¹³ The *Community Economic Development Centre* at SFU is conducting a three-year research initiative called "Promoting CED for BC Forest Communities". Four pilot communities have been involved throughout the project.

¹⁴ Pinkerton & Weinstein (1995) also identify some indicators of communities that would tend to have success in cultivating community-based fisheries management. These include: high dependence upon the fishery; high vulnerability to non-sustainable use; unwillingness or inability to transfer access rights out of the area; willingness to use mechanisms for equitable resource access; ability to assert management rights on informal or formal basis; and a willingness to invest resources in management if they will receive a meaningful voice in decisions.

and by becoming the foundation upon which to build community monitoring systems. In effect, this action-oriented research initiative promotes internal capacity building even as it assesses it.

A more empirical response to Marchak's concerns could be the level of interest that the Community Forestry Pilot Programme generated from communities in BC. Over 200 communities sent in applications, and over 25 went through the entire process of developing a preliminary forest management plan, business plan, and documentation of public support (Ministry of Forests, 1999). More often than not, the barriers to the implementation of community forestry initiatives have been the legislative context rather than a lack of social capital at the local level.

5.3 External Factors

Among the authors sampled for this literature review, only Gill & Reed (1998) put forth what could be construed as an argument against CBRM in the abstract. They assert that, in spite of tremendous growth in participatory processes at the community level, the ability of these processes to have tangible impact upon actual decisions is limited by a lack of *structural* capacity. In analysing their data, the authors employ a framework that “depicts various policy arenas along a continuum of scales of institutional arrangements that affect local land-use decisions” (Gill & Reed, 1998). This framework organises issues into three arenas: developmental, allocational, and organisational. At each of these levels, local issues and local decision-making processes are limited and marginalised due to their being embedded in wider institutional and political structures (regional, provincial, and federal governments in addition to non-governmental and commercial advocates at each level). For example, many in Squamish feel that issues pertaining to Whistler dominate the regional planning debates, especially when it comes to allocation of government resources.

This is, in effect, a concern that the existing legislative and governance approach in BC is not one which favours community-based alternatives. This is an argument made by many of the strongest advocates of CBRM. The overall policy structure in BC is one that favours large companies over small, volume over value, and capital over labour

(Markey & Roseland, 1999).¹⁵ It is also one that favours centralisation of planning and tenure over local self-determination. In the absence of specific tenure categories for community-based or ecosystem-based arrangements, much of the province's forest land-base and productive fisheries are managed according to the same productivist, export-driven models, no matter what the local ecological and social conditions. Even woodlots held by individuals or families must adhere to Annual Allowable Cuts (AACs) determined according to economic and political requirements as much as ecological ones. For this reason, one objective of the Ministry of Forests' Community Forestry Pilot Programme is to determine the effectiveness of existing legislation and, if necessary, develop a Community Forest tenure (Ministry of Forests, 1999).

One way to address many of these difficulties is to advocate for privatisation of BC's resources. According to Drushka, centralised ownership (the Crown) and control (large lumber companies) of BC's forests has not been successful in either of the present system's goals of a) maintaining non-forest values and b) directing economic development in the province. The industry is in a free-fall and is taking the resource with it. Drushka asserts that diversification of ownership would overcome this because a) it has stabilised the industry in other countries, b) the existing system does not provide enough economic security to promote other than short-term economic interests, and c) it works for American agriculture.¹⁶ Privatisation would allow communities and/or ecoforesters more freedom to pursue alternative cutting regimes (Drushka, 1993).

M'Gonigle (1998) agrees that some of the province's best forest practices occur on private woodlots. But so do most of the province's worst. Freedom from regulation on these lands has led directly to ecological innovation, but also to "rapacious

¹⁵ To shield itself from the effects of the 'bust' cycle that it has been in for the past four years (and to reap the benefits of improved technology), the forest industry has undertaken massive restructuring and laid off thousands of workers. The companies that drive the industry have demonstrated a significant lack of allegiance to the communities that depend upon their activities.

¹⁶ With this third point, Drushka reveals that his is a very anthropocentric position with little basis in ecological processes. A forest is not a farm, and – in the absence of an argument – it is a large assumption that the latter is as desirable as the former.

clearcutting.” As such, it is crucial to have some form of environmental standards that apply to all management and tenure arrangements. Drushka does not put forth a convincing argument that privatisation will allow such standards to be applied more effectively. In fact he does not put forth any argument whatsoever that diversification of *ownership* is necessary. As M’Gonigle points out, the debate over public vs. private is a false dichotomy, and is one which misses the broader point of how to “fulfil the larger complex of social interests associated with long-term, sustainable management and production” (M’Gonigle, 1998). As Quarter (1989) points out, the goal is ultimately to ensure that control of resources and production is broad, representative, and democratic. Hammond (1993) argues along the same lines with his analogy between the “public ownership” of BC’s forests and the “ownership” that a prisoner has over his body: he owns it, but has no control over what to do with it. Transfer of ownership is therefore not necessarily the best way to achieve greater local control and more sensitive environmental stewardship. Drushka himself seems to recognise this in one small sentence in the middle of his recommendations: there “is just as much need for diversity within the public forest sector as elsewhere.” If the goals of local decision-making and control, sustainable harvest rates, and increased silviculture can be attained through public ownership (and Drushka has not proven that they cannot, only that the current system is faulty), why privatise?

A more appropriate alternative would be to increase the diversity of tenure holders and tenure options. In addition to ‘private versus public’, another in the spectrum of organisational forms places this responsibility in the hands of the community (Pinkerton & Weinstein, 1995). There must be a new form of tenure that is based explicitly upon the value of ecosystems and communities; a slight modification of the existing tenure options and governance structures will not do.

6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is a very ingrained status quo in BC's resource-based industries that runs counter to the interests of communities and ecosystems. Large-scale industrial corporations dominate allocation processes; government policies – reflecting a 'captured-state' model – acquiesce and accommodate this due to the short-term economic gains and jobs that it generates for the province. Small businesses involved with logging and value-added processing continue to struggle to get access to wood while their communities struggle to maintain the intact watersheds that they need for their drinking water or non-timber forest activities. As Drushka points out, the "monopoly corporatism" in the province has created a situation where communities and their citizens are "reduced to squabbling among themselves over the remaining scraps of old-growth forests" (Drushka, 1993).¹⁷ This is not a climate that is conducive to the cultivation of positive social capital.

There is, then, a demonstrable need to change the way that resource management occurs in this province. The people of this province have a range of values that influence the way that they view and interact with their ecological and human communities. The status quo, however, is dominated by just one of them: the economic value of extracted resources and the products they spawn. One plausible alternative that has been presented in this review is community-based resource management. In sum, community-based resource management can be defined as management nested in a community that is devoted to the stewardship of natural, social, and economic capital in perpetuity. It must be grounded upon such values of CED as local control, participatory democracy, diversity, etc. This would *tend* to enable resource management to reflect the values and long-term interests of the community, and avoid interference with other land uses and initiatives in the community. Furthermore, it must be linked to the secondary

¹⁷ Marchak (1995) points out that just four groups of companies work almost all of the province's forest allocations, a number that is probably lower now with the recent take-over of MacMillan Bloedel by Weyerhaeuser.

manufacturing and processing activities that add value to the resource, to say nothing of the need for the market access necessary to realise this value. This will enable the community to reduce the AAC from what is required to sustain an extraction-based economy.

Based upon the literature analysed in the course of this review, it would appear that there is near consensus that the main obstacle to a systemic shift to community-based resource management is at the governance level. While Marchak (1995), Marchak et al (1999), and Markey & Roseland (1999) lament the lack of community capacity in many resource communities, it would appear that these concerns are not fundamental. The latter authors, especially, indicate that there is potential for communities to work together and/or with outside agencies to boost their capacity to undertake these initiatives. CED-oriented initiatives are occurring with increasing regularity and vigour across the province. Also increasing, however, is the degree to which these initiatives run up against limitations in policy. Community-based solutions cannot take root if the government allocates all but the most marginalised resources to productivist corporations. In the conclusion to his excellent paper, M’Gonigle (1998) points out that “beyond Left and Right, we need an imaginative state that can, in response to social interests, provide an alternative to its own bureaucracies and corporations, and ‘mandate’ community.” M’Gonigle is proclaiming the need for a new form of social ordering which “spans the abyss” between the traditional state and its corporate counterparts on the one hand, and the ecosystem-based ideal on the other. What is proposed is, without question, an experimental shift: there are any number of models to employ and no two communities are completely alike. Many community-based initiatives will not succeed. But these will only be failures if others fail to learn from them. Based upon the literature analysed in this review, recommendations on how to get there are as follows:

1. Ensure that community-based resource management explicitly rests upon principles of sustainability as an end and community economic development as a means. This entails explicitly cultivating the discussion of values in addition to ‘facts’.

2. Instate the necessary legislation – such as a Community Forest tenure and Community Fisheries Management arrangement – to allow local communities greater access to their resources, and give them the opportunity to manage them in a manner that is ecologically, economically, and socially sustainable.
3. Change the allocation processes to allow small business loggers, silviculturalists, fishers, and processors greater access to the resources without having to compete with other small producers over the marginal lands.
4. Promote linkages between community-based initiatives to record successes and failures to develop the collective wisdom and capacity of this sector.
5. Ensure that those with analytic and/or research capacity (such as the CEDC) continue to work with communities to enable the latter to boost their internal capacity to manage their resources in this manner.



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